The Budget Process and Legislative Behavior: Individual Amendments, Support for the Executive, and Government Programs by Fernando Limongi & Argelina Figueiredo




The Budget Process and Legislative Behavior: Individual 
Amendments, Support for the Executive, and Government 
Programs* 
      
 
 






The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of 
exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive 
policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through 
Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call 
votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: 
individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the 
Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by 
the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor 
votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in 
the Executive-Legislative relationship. 





Analyses of Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil assume the right of Congress to amend the 
budget as a central point. In these analyses, the participation of Congress in the budgetary 
process is reduced to the individual right to propose amendments to the budget. It is not difficult 
to understand why this part of the budget process attracts so much attention: individual 
amendments provide the elements that support the current interpretation about the modus 
operandi of the Brazilian political system. It provides, above all, the necessary evidence to 
argue that this system revolves around individualistic politicians, who are only interested in 
clientelistic and pork barrel distribution of public resources.  
 
Individual amendments are supposed to be the central part of a complex system of political 
exchanges that can guarantee, in Congress, the support the government needs and, in the 
electoral arena, the resources that representatives seek to deliver to their constituencies. As the 
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Executive has the final word regarding the authorization of spending, individual amendments 
are seen as a “political currency” available to politicians. The Executive could obtain support 
for his desired set of policies by providing resources for pork barrel policies that representatives 
want to deliver to their constituency. Therefore, this system would seal agreements among the 
electorate, legislators and the Executive. In this sense, analyzing individual amendments has 
been seen as the “lost link” that would join the electoral and legislative arenas in a single 
analytical body.  
 
 
Concerning the electoral arena, the argument is based on the assumption that the basic need of 
any politician is to find the necessary means to guarantee their reelection. In order to do so, 
according to the current analysis textbook, there is a strategy that can guarantee the highest 
political return for politicians, i.e., to provide tangible benefits to clearly defined constituencies. 
Voters, in acknowledgement to or, more precisely, as a way of paying back for the provided 
services, would retribute with their votes. In other words, individual amendments to the budget 
would be part of an electoral strategy identified by the specialized literature as “the personal 
vote” (Cain, Ferejohn e Fiorina, 1987). The Brazilian “electoral connection” – to use another 
fashionable term – would be, therefore, dependent on the implementation of these 
amendaments1. In fact, references to current concepts in North-American literature are not even 
necessary here. The caricatural portrayal of politicians is not different in the case of Brazil: they 
are individualistic and solely interested in getting votes and, in doing so, they would sacrifice 
public welfare.  
 
Regarding the legislative arena, the argument follows similar patterns. It relies on the usual 
consequences attributed to presidentialism, i.e., a lack of mechanisms that could guarantee 
Presidents the political support needed to their legislative agenda. The Executive needs the 
votes of legislators but it does not have the means to gather them. Prime-ministers, on the 
contrary, could guarantee support by threatening to dissolve Parliament or to anticipate 
elections, putting at risk the tenure of legislators.  
 
However - so the argument goes - as in Brazil the President controls budget execution, i.e. the 
budget approved by Congress is not mandatory, the Executive is able to exchange the resources 
that representatives want to deliver to their constituencies with votes to approve the government 
agenda. Authorizing the execution of budget resources, therefore, would be the way the 
Executive gathers support from Representatives.  
  
It is quite frequent to hear in the Press and within the academic community, that there is a trade-
off between the authorization to execute amendments and support to the Executive in roll-call 
votes. On the 27th of November 2003, when this article started to be written, the headlines of the 
newspaper O Estado de São Paulo concerning the approval, by the Senate, of a tax reform bill 
sent by the government informed that Senators would receive a compensation for approving 
what the government wanted by agreeing to authorize the spending of public resources 
demanded by legislators’ electoral clienteles.  
 
Academic views are no different. For Santos et alii (1997): 
 
“In the budget game [...] is possible to identify two distinct logics: the Executive’s, 
acting to approve bills of the government agenda and, in the contemporary context of 
economic stabilization, to cut expenses; and the Legislature’s, which is primarily 
interested in maximizing the electoral gains of its members and, only secondarily, acting 
to approve bills that, representing general public welfare, do not bring immediate 
individual gains. […]. [During the phase of consideration of the Executive bill by 
Congress] the logic of the Legislature’s game is predominant, forcing the Executive to 
negotiate with the Budget Committee the bills it wants to see approved. 
However, during the budget implementation stage, the Executive overturns this 
advantage. […] although deciding at the last moment of the process on this distributive 
conflict, the Executive is still not absolute sovereign as it is forced to negotiate vetoes, 
cuts, supplemental appropriations in exchange to parliamentary support to the policies 
that are priority to the governmental agenda.” (idem: 118-119). 
 
According to Pereira and Mueller (2002), the execution of individual amendments is “one of the 
most important mechanisms that the Executive has at its disposal to negotiate its preferences 
with the coalition in Congress”. The control of the budget process by the Executive gives “a 
low-cost and extremely useful political means to be exchanged by political support from the 
government coalition in Congress” (idem:267). For these authors: 
 
“The evidences presented […] show that the President rewards representatives who vote 
systematically to approve the bills government is interested in, authorizing the execution 
of their individual amendments, and, at the same time, punishes the ones that did not 
vote for these bills by simply not executing the amendments proposed by them” 
(idem:274). 
 
In this article, we try to explore these arguments by looking not only at the empirical aspects 
involved but also at their theoretical assumptions. First, it is important to say that, independent 
of the point of view used to analyze these aspects, individual amendments are far from being the 
most important way that Congress participates in the budgetary process. Besides individual 
amendments, there are two other types of amendments: collective – that are signed by State or 
Regional caucuses or by Committees – and institutional – that are signed by the rapporteurs of 
the budgetary annual bill, either the general or partial rapporteurs. From the Congress point of 
view, individual amendments are not a priority.  Congress allocates much more resources 
through the collective and the rapporteurs’ amendments. Since the definition of the amount of 
resources allocated by each type of amendments is an internal decision of Congress, such 
evidence is enough to question the view that the budgetary process is oriented exclusively to 
respond to individual interests of representatives.  
 
Nonetheless, given the central role normally attributed to the liberation of resources to 
individual amendments within Executive-Legislative relations, we look into the assumption that 
votes are exchanged by the execution of amendments and we show that it is not possible to 
establish this claimed causal relationship. In order to do so, we examine the approval and the 
execution rates of individual amendments for the 1996-2001 period2. What we find is that 
amendments can be executed without the expected voting behavior, and also votes are casted in 
support of the government without the expected matching part – i.e., authorization for spending. 
Given the high rates of turnover in the Brazilian Congress, there are cases in which to exchange 
votes for the execution of amendments is not even possible. There are countless cases of 
representatives voting according to the interests of the Executive but did not participate in the 
budgetary process, and there are others who participated in the budget consideration process, 
had their amendments executed but did not hold a tenure in Congress anymore.  
 
We also discuss the behavioral assumptions involved in the “political exchange” argument. The 
argument that amendments are “a political currency” assumes that legislators have a common 
interest, i.e., to promote distributive policies. These policies are supposed to be the most 
appropriate way to raise the chances of representatives being reelected. Implicitly, individual 
amendments are seen as an opposite tool to the interests of the Executive as it is assumed that, if 
the Executive could allocate resources freely, it would not sponsor the policies proposed by 
legislators. According to this argument, when the President authorizes the outlay of resources 
allocated by individual amendments, he is forced to do it against his own priorities. Concerning 
the allocation of public resources, the Executive-Legislative relation could be characterized as a 
zero-sum game. 
 
We argue that this view completely ignores party membership, which divides representatives in 
two fields: the ones supporting government and the opposition. From a political point of view, 
this division is previous and more profound than the participation in the budgetary process via 
individual amendments. Concerning specifically the budgetary process, such relation is based 
on the centralization of budget consideration. There is a delegation of power from backbenchers 
to party leaders represented, in this case, by the general rapporteur and his direct collaborators 
(Figueiredo and Limongi, 2002; 2003). 
 
We show that there is no significant differences regarding the allocation of public resources by 
the two branches of government. Their priorities are not radically different. To put it differently, 
there is no conflict of agendas. When resources allocated by legislators are authorized to be 
executed, the Executive does not waver to political pressures and abdicates to implement its 
own agenda. The allocation of resources by legislators is rather complementary, not 
oppositional to the Executive and the reason for this is the control the Executive has over the 
budget process, which is much larger than normally assumed. The Executive is able to channel 
the demands of representatives and to accommodate them within its government program. 
Indeed, this explains why the Executive executes amendments proposed either by opposition or 
allied legislators who do not vote according to the interests of the government.  
 
BUDGET EXECUTION AND SUPPORT TO THE EXECUTIVE 
 
The individual amendment is only one of the ways representatives can change the budget 
proposal sent by the Executive. Internal resolutions of the National Congress regulate the 
participation of legislators during the budget consideration process – i.e., internal resolutions of 
the Budget Committee – CMO, in Portuguese3 – which also foresees the presentation of 
collective and rapporteurs’ amendments.  
 
The relative participation of individual amendments in the total amount of resources allocated 
by the Legislature is quite small. In the analyzed period, the participation of individual 
amendments in all approved amendments made by Congress was only 17.4%. Put it conversely 
in order to emphasize this point: 82.6% of all resources allocated by Congress to public 
investments in the federal budget came from collective or institutional actors (rapporteurs). This 
is a decision made by Congress itself. Of all resources allocated in the budget, Congress opts to 
reserve the vast majority of them to collective forms of amendments. It is not easy to adapt such 
a fact to the usual emphasis on “personal vote” and the individualistic behavior of Brazilian 
politicians. If individual amendments are so crucial to reelection proposes, why to allocate the 
“lion’s share” to other kinds of amendments? 
 
It is also worth noting that when the Executive is authorizing the execution of the budget, the 
individual amendments of legislators are not a priority either. Individual amendments have the 
lowest execution rates: the overall average for the period is 59.6% in contrast with 78% of 
execution for Committees amendments, 62.2% for State caucuses amendments and 65.4% for 
the general budget rapporteur. If legislators had the bargaining power normally attributed to 
them, we would expect higher levels of concessions in comparison to what they actually get. 
Moreover, if individual amendments are so decisive for their political careers, why do they not 
rebel against the low rates of execution? Or, put it in a different way, if the government had the 
alleged difficulty in gathering support to his own agenda, we could expect the focus to be on 
individual amendments made by legislators.  
 
In sum, whether we look into the allocations made by Congress or to the Executive’s decision to 
execute the resources allocated by the Legislature, we cannot find support to the assumption that 
individual amendments are central in this process. In both parts of this process, collective 
amendments and the ones presented by rapporteurs are the priority. However, in spite of the fact 
that these figures are public and known, the public opinion, the Press and political scientists still 
believe that individual amendments are the central axis structuring the budget process. These 
interpretations are based on false theoretical conceptions and assumptions about the logic 
behind the Brazilian political system and we return to this point further on.  
 
Given the importance normally attributed to individual amendments, in this paper we will not 
analyze the remaining types of amendments and will concentrate on the first one. Our objective 
is to show that even if they are analyzed alone – i.e., when the rest of the budgetary process is 
ignored – the execution of individual amendments does not support the argument that they are 
used as a “political currency” in order to obtain parliamentary support.  
 
Since 1995, when an internal resolution of the Two-Houses Budget Committee (CMO) was 
approved – every year Congress defines ceilings to individual amendments, limiting the 
maximum number of amendments and the maximum amount of resources each legislator can 
appropriate. Therefore, in this respect, there is no differentiation among legislators. Throughout 
the whole period, a maximum of 20 amendments per representative per year was the rule. 
Regarding the amount of resource available in the appropriation bill, the ceiling has varied 
during the period. From 1996 to 1999, the ceiling was established at R$ 1,5 million, raising to 
R$ 2 million in 2000. In the 2001 budget, this amount was again reviewed, changing to R$ 2.5 
million4. This means that, from the point of view of individuals, each legislator has the same 
capacity to influence the final allocation of resources in the appropriation bill. Party affiliation, 
the number of mandates, the position within the hierarchy in Congress, region or State origins, 
connections with the Executive, in sum, none of the legislators’ characteristics affects their 
capacity to allocate resources.  
 
As resources are distributed in such a uniform way, there is no point in investigating which 
group of legislators, whichever they might belong to, wins or looses with the allocations made. 
The adopted rules that distribute resources equally neutralize the influence that any other factor 
could have had to distinguish representatives politically. Therefore, it makes no sense to talk 
about political exchanges in order to get amendments approved. There is no support or interests 
to be exchanged. Each of them has their quota secured beforehand and they are not dependent 
on the votes of other legislators to get their interests secured. Universalism is the adopted rule, 
which is granted in the Preliminary Report written by the general rapporteur. 
 
The adoption of this rule affects the relationship among legislators and between them and the 
rapporteurs. They are all treated as equal, a fact that neutralizes or, at least, diminishes the 
degree of conflict that the access to scarce resources might provoke. As far as it is known, 
before the adoption of this rule, the division of resources among legislators was quite unequal, 
favoring subgroups of legislators that had special access to the positions of power within the 
budgetary process. In the previous scheme, the group connected to legislators controlling the 
production of budget reports was in an advantageous position, giving rise to a huge scheme of 
corruption which was revealed to the public in 1992 and investigated by Congress in 1993. 
 
The current uniform division of resources among legislators should be seen, thus, as part of a 
rationalization of legislative participation in the budgetary process, a rationalization that 
awarded an institutional role to rapporteurs as they became more subject to party leaders control 
and guarantees, therefore, the prevalence of the interests of the majoritarian coalition supporting 
the Executive. By guaranteeing a uniform distribution of resources to all representatives, the 
general rapporteurs of the budget can act more freely as they do not need to arbitrate internal 
disputes for resources. In this sense, this principle reduces the costs of approving the proposal of 
the rapporteur.  
 
Congressional internal conflict is transferred to another stage of the budgetary process: the 
execution or the authorization to spend budget items. During consideration of the budget 
proposal, the distribution of resources is uniform but, during execution, the logic is different. 
That is, the Executive, who has a wide degree of freedom to execute the budget, as it is not 
mandatory, especially concerning resources of the investment area, discriminate – or can 
discriminate – representatives. For this reason, outlays do not necessarily have to match the 
distribution of resources approved by legislators. 
 
There is a deep contrast concerning the participation of representatives in the authorization and 
execution stages. Table 1 shows that individual execution rates of legislators’ amendments vary 
significantly5. For example, for the 1996 approved budget, among the 444 legislators that 
allocated resources for investment with individual amendments, 20.3% of them had an 
execution rate lower than 10%. In this same year, but on the other extreme of the distribution, 
only eight representatives (1.8% of the legislators that approved some amendment) had the full 
amount of their amendments executed by the Executive. It is noticeable, therefore, that 
execution, in opposition to authorization, differentiates legislators. 
 
Table 1 
Percentage of House Representatives by Rates of Execution of Individual Amendments 
(Deciles) in the Investment Area (1996-2001) 
 
















0 to 10 20,3 2,4 9,7 3,4 3,0 1,8 
10 to 20 13,3 3,5 9,7 3,2 4,9 1,4 
20 to 30 11,5 5,7 9,0 5,8 5,3 2,4 
30 to 40 9,2 7,7 7,1 6,4 8,1 5,3 
40 to 50 10,1 9,0 12,0 8,2 9,7 6,9 
50 to 60 10,4 13,4 14,0 12,6 10,7 8,7 
60 to 70 8,6 11,6 17,4 14,4 15,4 11,0 
70 to 80 8,1 15,7 14,0 11,6 17,9 17,6 
80 to 90 3,8 16,5 6,0 19,2 13,4 21,3 
90 to 100 2,9 13,2 1,1 13,4 10,1 20,3 
100 1,8 1,2 0,0 2,0 1,6 3,4 
        
Average Rate 38,3 63,4 47,1 63,9 61,4 71,9 
Number of 
Representatives 444 491 465 501 507 507 
Source: Budget and Financial Overseeing Consultancy from the House of Representatives 
(Câmara dos Deputados) and Legislative Database, Cebrap. 
* The execution rate is the total amount of executed amendments (in Reais) upon the total 
amount of approved amendments in the budget appropriation bill; it includes all 
individual amendments to the investment area of the budget that was presented and 
executed. 
 
The final participation of legislators concerning the allocation of resources is quite 
heterogeneous, and this heterogeneity is the result of decisions made by the Executive to defer 
spending (to impound) or to authorize the execution of allocated resources. Given that the 
Executive has a high degree of freedom to choose which parts of the budget will be 
implemented, we should ask what are the criteria used by this branch to guide his decisions6. It 
is worth noting that annual execution rates varied throughout the period. The year that presented 
the lowest execution rates was 1996, when less than 40% of all approved individual 
amendments were executed, and over 50% of legislators had less than 40% of their amounts 
executed. 1998 was another poor year for representatives while 2001 was the most successful 
one. As we have argued elsewhere, we believe this variation does not depend on the pressure 
exercised by Congress. The overall rate is due to macroeconomic policies pursued by the 
government7. 
 
If execution rates are organized by groups of parties, as in Table 2 below, we have a better idea 
about the criteria used by the Executive to guide his decisions. Legislators belonging to center 
or right-wing parties that supported the governement8 are the ones who benefited most, while 
left-wing members – or opposition in the analyzed period – suffer the greatest losses. An 
obvious conclusion seems to emerge: the execution of individual amendments is dictated by 
partisanship criteria. 
Table 2 
Average Rates of Execution* of Individual Amendments in the Investment Area by 
Political Party – 1996-2001 
 
Party** 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Government Coalition (GOV) 
PFL 50,4 71,0 61,8 72,3 67,2 82,3
PMDB 44,6 68,0 51,0 70,2 70,7 79,5
PPB 38,5 59,5 43,3 61,2 66,8 76,3
PSDB 45,2 70,8 53,5 68,1 72,8 79,1
PTB 32,7 62,6 58,2 70,9 59,3 71,2
Small Right-wing Parties (SRWP) 
PL 32,0 56,3 53,1 70,0 38,4 64,0
PSC  100,0     
PSD 23,1 64,9 66,5 65,8 64,0  
PSL 19,1 77,9 46,1  47,0 77,0
Prona   43,8 42,7   
PST     62,2 59,1
PHS     61,0 88,4
PTN      91,3
No party membership 37,1 81,1   44,6  
Left-wing Parties (LWP) 
PC do B 17,7 39,7 17,4 47,2 30,3 41,5
PDT 16,9 48,7 24,9 37,0 40,3 50,4
PMN 17,9 46,5 21,4 67,6 48,0  
PPS   21,8 62,7 52,7 58,9
PSB 10,3 57,2 21,5 65,1 37,1 50,3
PT 15,5 44,0 15,3 39,1 31,1 45,9
PV 5,0 42,3 0,0 55,1 99,9 73,1
PSTU    0,0   
       
Subtotals 
GOV 44,1 67,1 53,4 68,6 69,0 79,1
SRWP 30,9 65,5 54,2 67,1 48,3 66,5
LWP 15,3 46,9 18,7 44,6 36,0 48,6
TOTAL 38,3 63,4 47,1 63,9 61,4 71,9
Source: Budget and Financial Overseeing Consultancy from the House of Representatives (Câmara dos 
Deputados) and Cebrap Legislative Database. 
* The execution rate is the total amount of executed amendments (in Reais) upon the total amount of 
approved amendments in the budget appropriation bill; it includes all individual amendments to the 
investment area of the budget that was presented and executed. 
** See list of abbreviations at the end of this article. 
 
The support to the Executive agenda in roll-call votes follows the same pattern. Members of 
parties who belong to the government coalition support the government. The opposition does 
not. A roll-call is considered part of the Executive agenda if voting refers to a constitutional 
amendment and, at the same time, the government position – against or in favor – is made 
public. It is a stricter criterion than normally used and it allows a more accurate test of the 
hypothesis being explored here. As the approval of amendments to the Constitution demands a 
qualified majority, the vote of each legislator is more important to the Executive than in an 
ordinary, simple majority roll-call. If a legislator, for whatever reason, did not vote, his/her vote 
was classified as undisciplined if the Executive called for a ‘yea’ vote9. Only those legislators 
voting in 10 or more roll-calls within a year were included in the analysis. The number of roll-
calls considered varied per year. In order to maintain the consistency in the analysis, the sample 
includes only legislators that presented amendments to the budget and that did not switch to 
parties from opposition to allied or vice-versa. 
 
Table 3 shows clearly that voting in accordance to the government agenda is related to party 
affiliation. The average support rate of a government coalition party member is around 75% 
with some variation among parties10. Legislators who are members of PFL and PSDB tended to 
vote more united and consistently in comparison to legislators belonging to PPB and PMDB. In 
the latter two parties, in some issues or areas, there were few legislators whose voting behavior 




































Average Percentage of Support to the Executive Agenda by Political Party 
Roll-call Votes in Constitutional Amendments – 1996-2001 
 
Party/Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 TOTAL 
Government Coalition (GOV) 
PFL 79,0 89,5 81,8 77,3 79,6 73,6 80,5 
PMDB 70,3 74,4 64,1 68,3 68,3 67,9 68,9 
PPB 71,1 71,3 63,0 70,7 79,7 77,3 71,4 
PSDB 80,3 86,2 79,9 77,4 84,5 75,9 81,1 
PTB 78,0 75,3 77,3 78,8 80,5 75,2 77,4 
Small Right-wing Parties (SRWP) 
PL 52,6 61,0 55,0 52,1 46,9 49,8 52,4 
PSC     59,3  59,3 
PSD 74,0 73,9 65,9    71,7 
PSL 79,6 73,9   21,1 31,8 38,9 
Prona  92,6 90,9    91,8 
PST    53,1 46,4 50,0 48,7 
PHS     77,8 70,0 73,9 
PTN    93,3 20,0 36,4 49,9 
PSDC      9,1 9,1 
No party 
membership   65,8  43,3  52,3 
Left-wing Parties (LWP) 
PC do B 21,2 4,2 0,0 24,4 18,6 7,8 11,9 
PDT 18,0 11,3 5,4 19,6 6,7 13,2 11,7 
PMN 3,7 29,6     16,7 
PPS  53,1 14,5 81,3 30,7 26,4 31,9 
PSB 14,3 20,2 3,0 22,9 17,4 11,9 13,9 
PT 6,9 0,3 3,7 14,8 18,4 17,0 11,0 
PV 24,0 30,8 5,3 37,5 30,0 90,9 36,4 
PSTU  0,0 4,8    2,4 
 
Subtotals 
GOV 75,3 80,7 72,0 74,8 77,7 73,7 75,8 
SRWP 65,8 70,8 62,6 52,3 39,2 41,9 54,0 
LWP 14,9 8,7 5,7 20,9 18,0 14,7 13,4 
TOTAL 64,0 67,6 59,1 64,9 63,9 59,7 53,1 
    
N 29 31 45 25 41 17 188 
 Source: House of Representatives Journal, Cebrap Legislative Database. 
 
There is an obvious correlation between the execution of individual amendments and the 
behavior in roll-call votes. The execution of the resources allocated by individual amendments 
in the approved budget favors precisely the members of parties who vote in support of the 
legislative agenda of the Executive. There is, thus, strong evidence of a relationship between 
them. The thesis that asserts the execution of individual amendments is used as a “political 
currency” suggests that this relationship is the result of individual negotiations and that the 
President rewards or punishes legislators according to their voting behavior – whether in favor 
or against the government (Pereira and Mueller, 2002:274). If this is the case, we should 
conclude that the partisan correlation is spurious. Party affiliation, therefore, would not 
influence behavior on the floor or the execution of amendments. Legislators would be 
individually rewarded or punished by the Executive. What would count on this matter is their 
behavior on the floor, independent of the party they belong to.  
 
It is no novelty to point out that a correlation, showed either by regression analysis or 
comparison of means, is not enough to demonstrate the existence of a causal association 
between two variables. The problem is to specify whether there is a relationship between the 
behavior on the floor and the execution of amendments that are independent of party affiliation. 
If we find low execution rates and low government support only among the representatives that 
belong to opposition parties and high rates of execution and higher support to the government 
only among the members of the government coalition parties, it will be difficult to distinguish 
between the explanations based on individual relationships and the ones based on party 
membership. Individual negotiations or negotiations centralized around party leaders would 
produce similar results. The point is, therefore, how to separate these two explanations. Given 
the correlation of both variables to party membership, it matters to distinguish what can be 
credited to the party and to individual negotiations.  If we find cases of left-wing legislators with 
high execution rates and high rates of favorable votes to the Executive, and/or members of the 
coalition parties who vote against the government and present low execution rates, we would 
have strong evidences that negotiations are individual. Cases like this would suggest the 
existence of an individual bargain in spite of party affiliation.  
 
Concerning the first possibility, as Graph 1 shows, there are no cases of opposition members 
voting systematically with the government. The variation of execution rates, though, is much 
higher than support to the government. Among these representatives, the norm is low scores in 
both variables. Having said that, we can still notice a few cases of medium to high rates of 
amendments execution but without the expected correspondence on roll-call votes – in fact, 
there are cases of legislators who gave no support at all to the government and had their 
amendments fully executed. We can conclude, then, that the authorization for spending, at least 
among left-wing party members, is not positively associated with voting with the government. 
Amendments are executed without votes being given to the Executive. For this subgroup of 
representatives, the variables present a reasonable degree of independence. However, what we 























Rates of Execution of Amendments proposed by Opposition Representatives according to 
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Source: Budget and Financial Overseeing Consultancy from the House of Representatives, House of 
Representatives Journals and Cebrap Legislative Database. 
 
When we turn to the case of members of the government coalition, as it can be seen in Graph 2, 
we find more cases that could fit the argument of “political currency for pork”, as there are a 
considerable number of cases of low support to the government and low execution rates. 
Nonetheless, there is a similar number of cases with high execution rates but low government 
support – i.e., they are Representatives who voted systematically against the government and 
still had their amendments executed. The accumulation of cases of high support to the 
government and low execution rates is of greater concern. In other words, there are legislators 
who vote with the government although they do not receive, in retribution, the execution of their 
amendments. As these cases are not the exception, one can conclude that the disseminated 
assumption in the national political chronicle of a strategy of ‘political currency for pork’ is not 
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Source: Budget and Financial Overseeing Consultancy from the House of Representatives,  House of Representatives 
Journals and Cebrap Legislative Database. 
 
Graph 2 shows that the distribution of cases is quite disperse. There is a concentration of cases 
on the right superior quadrant of the Graph. But it is clear that the distribution of support to the 
Executive is more homogenous and more concentrated in high values than the execution rates. 
Once again, we have indications that the behavior of both variables follows different paths. 
Party membership is a better predictor of voting behavior than the rates of execution of 
individual amendments.  
 
We tested the hypothesis that the partisan logic would determine both the behavior on the floor 
and the rates of execution for amendments. This hypothesis can be demonstrated by comparing 
results in three different models of logistic regression (Box 1). The first model used only one 
explanatory variable, a dummy variable identifying whether a representative belongs or not to 
the government coalition. The second model uses the rates of execution as the independent 
variable. The third one combines the two previous models, i.e., the rate of support to the 
Executive is explained by party membership and rates of amendments execution.  
 
Box 1 
Determinants of Voting Behavior. Executive’s Agenda. Logistic Regressions 
1996-2001 
 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B       S.E.       Sig B       S.E.       Sig B       S.E.       Sig 
Constant -1,54     0,00      0,00 -0,96    0,00    0,00 -2,09   0,03      0,00 
Government Coalition 2,55     0,02      0,00  2,20    0,02     0,00 
Rates of Execution 0,026   0,02    0,00  0,02    0,00     0,00 
% of correct predictions 75,36 67,86 75,36 
N= 67.055 
* N is the combination of Congressmen and votes. However, not all Congressmen voted in all roll-calls. The same 
188 roll-calls included in Table 3 were analyzed here. Only the 719 Congressmen who voted at least in 10 different 
occasions, did not switch parties within a year and presented amendments to the budget were included. 
 
In the three models, the coefficients present the expected signals and are statistically significant, 
a result probably already anticipated by the ones familiarized with this type of analysis 
considering the evidences presented before and the number of cases included in the analysis. 
What we want to compare, though, is the explanatory capacity of each model to account for 
voting behavior on the floor. Therefore, this comparison takes as a baseline all the votes with 
the government, which represents 60.3% (40.459/67.055) of all votes given in the roll-calls 
included in the analysis. Thus, it is not even necessary any statistical model to arrive at a rate of 
correct prediction: if one simply “guesses” that all representatives will vote with the 
government, the rate of correct prediction will be 60.3% of the cases. 
 
The first model, which uses one variable identifying whether the legislator is a member of the 
government coalition, predicts 75.36% of the votes correctly. The second model, whose 
independent variable is the rate of execution of individual amendments, predicts 67.86% of the 
votes correctly. The explanatory power of the rate of execution of amendments is smaller than 
the previously one and, even worse, it cannot improve the model results when added to the first 
estimation. The difference between the first and the third model is null11. 
 
These results suggest that party membership explains both the voting behavior on the floor and 
the execution of amendments. This conclusion is reinforced when we look at the cases of 
representatives who voted, although they had no amendments to be executed and also the ones 
that had amendments executed without voting. In both cases, party membership can be used as 
an explanatory variable. In other words, there is a group of legislators whose behavior cannot be 
explained by the “political currency for pork” thesis. The budget is amended and approved in 
one year but executed throughout the following year. Because of the changes in the composition 
of the Lower House, the set of representatives that have their amendments approved are not 
necessarily the same ones that will be holding office when amendments are executed. As a 
result, there are legislators who amend the budget bill and do not hold any office (hence, cannot 
vote) in the year of execution and there are representatives who vote but did not participate in 
the consideration process of the budget and, thus, have no amendments to be executed. This last 
group should be a problem for the Executive. If the liberation of resources for individual 
amendments is the means by which the Executive can gather favorable votes to his agenda, how 
can support be obtained? In these cases, the Executive would not have the usual tool available to 
obtain support. 
 
In post-electoral years, as it is the case of 1999 in our database, the difference between Congress 
composition at the time of approving the budget and executing amendments reaches the extreme 
as the rates of turnover are relatively high. From the point of view of the Executive, this should 
be an extremely difficult year in the legislative arena12. 
 
In this sense, comparing the behavior of these two groups of legislators on the floor – the ones 
with amendments to be executed and the ones with no amendments included in the budget– 
should reveal interesting differences. However, as Table 4 shows, the behavior of these two 
groups is not radically different. It is worth noting that the number of representatives who did 
not participate in the budget consideration process is quite large13.  
 
This is especially the case of 1999, when a new elected Congress sworn in. In that year, 154 out 
of 370 members of the government coalition did not have the opportunity to present 
amendments to the budget14. Nevertheless, these representatives voted accordingly to their party 
membership. Legislators members of the government coalition followed the vote orientation 
announced by the leader of the government on the floor, independently of having or not 
amendments to be executed. How could the Executive have obtained these votes in these cases? 
If the government is always depending on the liberation of resources to govern, it would have 
been impossible to govern in 1999. The conclusion one reaches is straightforward: voting 
behavior on the floor is determined by party membership. 
 
Table 4 
Average Percentage of Support to the Executive Agenda by Groups of Representatives 
and Political Party 
Roll-Calls Votes in Constitutional Amendments – 1996-2001 
Groups of Representatives 
Had amendments approved in the 
Budget/Appropriation Bill 







 AVG STD DEV N AVG STD DEV N 
1996 GOV 75,3 21,7 330 76,5 21,4 63
 LWP 14,9 12,5 77 10,6 7,7 26
 SRWP 65,8 25,0 21 87,6 7,1 2
 Total 64,0 30,9 428 57,9 35,2 91
 
1997 GOV 80,7 21,3 347 85,7 16,6 49
 LWP 8,7 13,8 78 5,0 11,4 24
 SRWP 70,8 29,7 15 53,9  1
 Total 67,6 34,2 440 59,1 40,7 74
 
1998 GOV 72,0 24,9 367 78,3 18,9 37
 LWP 5,7 12,3 89 2,5 4,6 9
 SRWP 62,6 29,7 13 25,0  1
 Total 59,1 34,7 469 62,7 34,9 47
 
1999 GOV 74,8 19,1 216 79,5 18,3 154
 LWP 20,9 13,1 46 23,5 15,0 67
 SRWP 52,3 17,3 8 42,5 23,1 12
 Total 64,9 27,3 270 61,5 31,0 233
 
2000 GOV 77,7 20,8 379 82,5 20,3 4
 LWP 18,0 9,7 104 15,1 5,9 6
 SRWP 39,2 24,3 19    
 Total 63,9 31,2 502 42,0 37,0 10
 
2001 GOV 73,7 23,5 333 72,8 30,5 27
 LWP 14,7 8,3 93 16,4 9,6 20
 SRWP 41,9 22,0 26 54,6 , 1
 Total 59,7 32,1 452 48,9 36,5 48
 
TOTAL GOV 75,8 22,3 1972 79,2 20,1 334
 LWP 13,4 12,5 487 15,9 14,2 152
 SRWP 54,0 27,5 102 48,1 25,0 17
  Total 63,1 32,2 2561 59,0 34,5 503
Source: Budget and Financial Overseeing Consultancy from the House of Representatives, House of Representatives 
Journals and Cebrap Legislative Database. 
* GOV = members of the government coalition parties; LWP = left-wing parties; SRWP = small right-wing parties. 
A representative is included only if he/she casted more than 10 votes in a given year.  
 
 
The opposite situation should also be considered, i.e., the cases of representatives who had 
amendments approved in the budget but were not members of Congress anymore at the time of 
execution. If the Executive cannot count on these votes anymore, one should expect the 
Executive not to execute these amendments. Table 5 compares these two groups of 
representatives and shows that the rates of amendment execution among legislators that hold 
office are higher in comparison to non-reelected legislators. However, such a difference is far 
from being radical. It calls the attention, above all, that amendments of representatives who did 
not cast a single vote in the entire period are, in fact, executed. Important to our argument here 
is that the rates of amendments execution among the members of the government coalition 
holding or not office are quite similar. Once again we conclude that party membership is crucial 
to understand Executive-Legislative relations. 
 
Table 5 
Average Rates of Execution of Individual Amendments in the Investment Area by Groups 
of Representatives and Political Party – 1996-2001 
 
Rates of Budget Execution 
Representatives who held 
office 
Representatives who did not 
hold office 
Year Party* AVG STD DEV N AVG STD DEV N 
1996 GOV 44,3 28,0 330 41,1 23,0 13 
 LWP 15,5 18,3 77 7,0 10,0 2 
 SRWP 30,9 26,6 21    
 Total 38,4 28,7 428 36,5 24,6 15 
 
1997 GOV 69,0 23,0 347 51,1 25,7 40 
 LWP 47,2 20,9 78 44,1 25,4 10 
 SRWP 65,5 19,1 15   
 Total 65,0 24,0 440 49,7 25,6 50 
 
1998 GOV 54,4 22,3 367 41,7 24,5 29 
 LWP 18,3 15,0 89 30,3 8,0 3 
 SRWP 53,2 17,6 13 61,3 27,8 2 
 Total 47,5 25,3 469 41,8 23,9 34 
 
1999 GOV 77,4 16,0 216 57,6 25,8 172 
 LWP 46,7 20,5 46 42,8 26,1 52 
 SRWP 67,6 27,7 8 66,5 26,3 6 
 Total 71,9 20,7 270 54,5 26,6 230 
 
2000 GOV 69,1 19,9 379 69,4 5,5 2 
 LWP 36,2 22,5 104 25,3 12,5 2 
 SRWP 48,3 23,7 19   
 Total 61,5 24,6 502 47,4 26,7 4 
 
2001 GOV 79,6 17,0 333 74,7 24,1 35 
 LWP 48,6 20,6 93 48,9 25,6 16 
 SRWP 68,2 19,7 26 44,8 63,4 2 
 Total 72,5 21,8 452 65,8 28,4 53 
 
Total GOV 64,9 24,9 1972 56,5 26,6 291 
 LWP 34,8 23,9 487 42,4 25,6 85 
 SRWP 54,4 26,1 102 61,1 31,5 10 
  Total 58,7 27,4 2561 53,5 27,1 386 
Source: Budget and Financial Overseeing Consultancy from the House of Representatives, Cebrap Legislative 
Database. 
* GOV = members of the government coalition parties; LWP = left-wing parties; SRWP = small right-wing 
parties. A representative is included only if he/she casted more than 10 votes in a given year.  
 
The execution of amendments without the expected voting behavior or voting for the Executive 
without amendments being executed do not fit the ‘political currency for pork’ thesis. In these 
cases, by definition, the postulated ‘exchanges’ cannot take place. Party membership explains 
both cases. Support to the Executive occurs according to party lines even if amendments are not 
presented. Levels of individual amendments execution also follow the government/opposition 
divide irrespective of the possibility of the actual voting take place.  
 
The notion that there is something to be traded –votes by budgetary resources - assumes that 
representatives and the Executive have independent, moreover, conflicting agendas. The 
representatives’ agenda would be expressed by individual amendments and it is seen as a direct 
function of their electoral strategies. The outlay would only take place when representatives 
exert pressure on the Executive who ends up deviating resources from his own agenda to obtain 
the votes he needs to in order to get his agenda approved.  
 
Each branch allocation pattern would follow the ‘electoral connection’ requirements, i.e., by the 
specific links they have with their electoral basis. This argument treats legislators as if they had 
homogenous interests – that is to say, as if all of them wanted to pursue the same type of 
policies. The Executive, in turn, would be the only political actor to bear in mind the general 
interests of the public. Each representative would only see their own electorate, their 
constituency. All of them would, in order to benefit their constituencies, use the same sort of 
policies, “delivering” to them tangible benefits. Individual amendments would be the means by 
which this electoral strategy becomes viable. In this sense, the execution of legislators’ 
amendments is seen as a concession made by the Executive, who would respond to the 
particularistic interests of representatives in exchange to obtain, on the floor, and as 
compensation, the votes necessary to approve the government agenda.  
 
However, why should we assume that the Executive and the Legislature are doomed to be in 
dispute? The fact that political parties play a role in this relation or, put it in a different way, 
there is a coalition of parties that support and another who opposes the government leads one to 
realize that legislators do not have homogenous interests, either concerning the policies they 
prefer or concerning the success of the government.  
 
Before we start a more in-depth discussion about this point and its implications to understand 
the role played by individual amendments, it is important to summarize the main conclusions 
we have reached thus far. The connection between the analyzed variables – execution of 
amendments and support to the Executive in the legislative arena – is far from being direct. It is 
clear that one variable does not explain the other. Both are dictated by a common cause: the 
party position in relation to the government, although party membership does not perfectly 
predict the support to the Executive. Party membership profile works better to explain the 
behavior in roll-call votes than the rates of amendment execution, the reason being that the 
Executive does not execute individual amendments as compensation to the behavior of 
representatives. By the same token, it is not true that legislators only support the government if 
their amendments are executed.  
 
BUDGET EXECUTION AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES 
 
When political scientists say that budget resources are allocated as a way of maximizing 
electoral returns for representatives, they bear in mind a specific model of electoral strategies 
pursued by politicians. In this kind of argument, politicians would only be interested in their 
offices or mandates. In other words, politicians are office-seeking and not policy-seeking, to use 
consolidated expressions in the area. It follows from this reasoning that policies pursued by 
legislators will be the ones that can maximize this end. 
 
North-American literature calls this strategy the “personal vote”. Politicians, by pursuing this 
strategy, would prefer to create personal and individual connections with their electorate, links 
that would be possible by providing public policies that distribute tangible goods to specific 
groups. Thus, it follows from this assumption that reelection-seekers legislators will use their 
amendment prerogative in a uniform way. All of them would use amendments in the way the 
political science “textbook” tell us they would, i.e., to promote distributive policies in order to 
get, in exchange, crucial votes for their reelection.   
 
If all of them adopted the same strategy, we would have to conclude that legislators cannot be 
distinguished based on their party membership. Shared interests, including distributive policies, 
would unite them against the interests of the Executive. The latter, given its electoral connection 
to a national electorate and the need to control macroeconomic effects of public spending, 
would be forced to take into consideration the general interests of the public.  
 
Therefore, according to this argument, the execution of individual amendments would not 
contribute to the implementation of government programs. Any amount of individual 
amendment executed implies a reduction in the outlays the Executive would have preferred. By 
executing these amendments, the Executive would transfer the resources, originally allocated 
according to his priorities, to respond to the interests, necessarily local and partial, of 
representatives. Even risking being repetitive, we want to emphasize this point: the Executive 
would only execute amendments if he was forced to do it, that is, as a mean of gaining the 
necessary votes to approve his legislative agenda. Executive and Legislative would have 
mutually excluding priorities.  
 
This thesis also assumes that the Executive has two separate agendas, a legislative and a 
budgetary one, and that these two are independent enough from each other to allow the support 
given to one of them to be compensated by the losses incurred in the other one. If you buy 
support in the legislative arena, you will sacrifice the budgetary agenda. The legislative agenda 
is seen as belonging to the spheres of policy choice while the decisions concerning the budget 
are seen as utility transfers without any connection between the two.  
 
In order to make this argument valid, one would have to assume that either the two agendas, 
legislative and budgetary, are independent – i.e., decisions made regarding to one of them 
would not affect decisions on the other – or the actors could not see the inter-relations between 
the two types of agendas. It is difficult to believe in any of these two alternatives. How could be 
possible for representatives not to know that the legislative agenda of the Executive that they are 
approving – for example, the Law on Fiscal Responsibility – has consequences over the 
available budgetary resources? Or how can one assume that the Executive would authorize 
spending for small particularistic projects without noticing that the sum of all these tiny 
resources will generate deficit and, as a result, undermine its policy agenda? To assume that the 
Executive and the Legislature see the budgetary agenda as independent from the legislative 
agenda is to suppose that one or the other – or both – behave irrationally. 
 
There are no trade-offs between an agenda dictated by representatives and another one dictated 
by the Executive. There are no exchanges because there are not two agendas. If there were two 
agendas, they would have to be the government and the opposition ones. But, in fact, from the 
point of view of individual amendments, there is only one agenda to be considered: the 
governmental one.  Individual amendments are a small part inside this agenda but, and this is 
what it matters for this article, they are still part of the government agenda. By allowing the 
execution of some individual amendments, the Executive is still implementing its own agenda, 
which part of the legislators are politically associated with, including, obviously, the electoral 
arena. This is the next point to be discussed. 
 
The right to present amendments is the opportunity legislators have to participate in the process 
of allocating resources within the budget bill, expressing their priorities concerning public 
policies. However, although they can count on a fixed and granted amount of appropriations, 
legislators cannot express their priorities with no restrictions at all. The structure of the budget 
process defines which programs or activities can be object of amendments. It is not possible to 
allocate resources to new programs or activities that were not presented in the original bill sent 
by the government. Moreover, if a legislator has the intention of seeing their amendment 
executed, they should take into account the priorities of the government and legislators are able 
to know what the priorities are. It is enough to look at the previous year rates of execution or the 
budget bill sent by the government to guess the Executive priorities.  
 
Besides all the constitutional restrictions that protect the Bill sent by the Executive, it is also 
important to consider the way Congress organizes its own participation in the budget process. 
As we have already discussed in other articles (Figueiredo e Limongi, 2002; 2003), the 
decisions that, in reality, affect – or can affect – the essence of the budget are made by the 
general and the partial rapporteurs. That is to say that the consideration of a budgetary bill in 
Congress is highly centralized and follows party lines. Regarding specifically individual 
amendments – the decentralized part of the process – the amount of appropriations to be divided 
is proposed by the general rapporteur in the preliminary report. As these appropriations are 
defined normally by linear cuts in the original Bill sent by the Executive, the distribution of 
individual amendments by categories of spending (or any other unit that the budget may be 
structured) is defined at this point15. Legislators have restricted options on how to allocate 
resources that are granted to them.   
 
Consequently, there is no significant difference among political parties when we look at 
individual amendments by the Ministries/agencies responsible for the actual execution of the 
amendments or by government programs. Table 6 presents the distribution of amendments by 
different spending units (normally, a Ministry/Cabinet). The first four columns show the 
percentage of the total for each group of parties (government coalition, small-right-wing and 
left-wing) allocated to that unit. They show, thus, the priority that each political group has given 
to one of these units. When we compare the entries in each one of the political groups, it is clear 
that there is a convergence among legislators. The priorities assigned by left-wing parties do not 



















Individual Amendments in the Investment Area by Budget Spending Unit and 
Representatives Political Position – 1996-2001 
 
Individual Amendments 
% of Total Amendments Approved 
Rates of Execution* % 
 












  Total  
      
Ministry of Planning, Budget  
and Management 38,6 42,6 32,3 37,6 72,1 64,5 38,7 66,6
National Fund for Health 12,1 17,3 16,1 13,0 61,6 60,5 51,2 59,3
National Health Foundation 7,8 7,6 6,6 7,6 69,3 54,0 63,4 67,8
Ministry of National Integration 6,8 6,8 5,0 6,5 67,9 57,6 25,0 61,6
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Supply Provision 6,4 4,7 5,6 6,2 74,1 55,7 24,4 65,6
Indesp 6,0 2,9 4,4 5,6 64,6 25,5 18,0 57,4
Ministry of Environment 5,4 4,5 3,9 5,1 56,6 56,2 43,0 54,7
National Fund for the Development 
of Education 3,8 5,3 5,5 4,2 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,1
National Fund for Social 
Assistance 2,7 2,1 4,0 2,9 68,1 32,1 17,8 54,9
Ministry of Education 1,2 0,4 2,6 1,4 33,1 13,1 10,4 25,8
DNER 1,4 0,6 1,4 1,4 33,3 47,0 18,6 31,0
National Fund for Culture 0,9 0,5 1,6 1,0 69,3 40,5 59,3 66,0
Codevasf 1,0 0,6 0,9 0,9 71,3 78,4 22,2 63,5
Ministry of Culture 0,7 0,4 1,1 0,8 53,6 7,3 24,9 46,0
DNOCS 0,6 0,1 0,8 0,6 72,2 100,0 14,4 58,7
Embratur  0,6 0,1 0,5 0,6 70,4 100,0 69,7 70,4
Sudene 0,5 1,0 0,3 0,5 49,3 24,6 59,5 48,6
Ibama 0,4 0,5 0,8 0,5 57,1 41,4 40,9 51,9
Others 3,1 2,1 6,6 3,7 55,6 47,6 48,1 53,1
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 64,4 55,2 37,0 59,2
Source: Budget and Financial Overseeing Consultancy from the House of Representatives, Cebrap Legislative 
Database. 
* The execution rate is the total amount of executed amendments (in Reais) upon the total amount of 
approved amendments in the budget appropriation bill; it includes all individual amendments to the 
investment area of the budget that was presented and executed. 
 
The last four columns of Table 6 show the average execution rates of individual amendments 
for each unit analyzed. Clearly, the government favors legislators who are members of its 
coalition in all units of spending. In some units, this discrimination is smaller than in others. 
This is specially the case of spending in the Ministry of Health (the National Fund for Health 
and the National Health Foundation), which average rates of amendment execution are more 
balanced. It is worth noting that these units of spending concentrate around 20% of all resources 
allocated by individual amendments. On the other hand, the case of the Ministry of Planning, 
which 37.6% of the total amount of individual amendments is allocated to, shows marked 
differences concerning the rates of execution. In this Ministry, representatives who are members 
of the government coalition parties have 72.1% of their amendments executed in contrast with 
38.7% for the opposition. Having said that, it is important to note that even for members of the 
coalition, execution rates varies with the specific category. The execution rate for an 
oppositionist at the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management is higher than the one 
obtained by members of the coalition in the Ministry of Education.  
 
Similar findings are seen when data is organized by government programs. The differences 
among the groups of parties are smaller than the convergence among them. Once again, within 
all programs it is noticeable that execution rates are higher for legislators belonging to parties 
that support the government. However, the rates of execution do depend also on the program 
overall execution rate. 
 
This data show that there is no clear divergence of agendas among legislators when they are 
grouped according to their position to the government. This reveals the capacity of the 
Executive and the budget rapporteurs to direct individual amendments to specific slots. The 
degree of freedom that representatives have is small. The opposition cannot use the budget 
process as a way to implement its agenda.  
 
The data reinforces the conclusion reached before: execution of individual amendments is ruled 
by political criteria. Amendments proposed by members of the government coalition parties are 
more likely to be executed than the ones presented by the remaining legislators. Yet, part of the 
amendments proposed by members of the opposition is also executed and part of the 
amendments presented by representatives who voted with the government is not executed. 
Moreover, there is a significant variation in the rates of execution depending on the 
Ministries/agencies and programs. To a large extent, this variation is the result of linear cuts 
made by impoundment decrees. These cuts – issued by the Executive – follow the priorities of 

































Individual Amendments in the Investment Area by Programs and Representatives 
Political Position – 1996-2001 
 













  Total  
      
Sanitation 23,5 25,0 19,8 22,9 69,2 59,8 45,2 65,1
Health 12,2 17,3 16,6 13,2 61,5 61,0 52,0 59,4
Urban Infrastructure 9,0 12,4 9,3 9,2 81,2 78,1 47,9 75,1
Housing 9,5 9,4 7,5 9,1 74,4 68,2 40,6 69,3
Integrated Programs 6,1 4,8 4,0 5,7 59,6 29,9 20,8 53,8
Physical Education and Sports 6,0 2,8 4,5 5,6 64,9 25,5 18,4 57,6
Hydric Resources 6,0 4,8 3,5 5,5 63,8 63,1 21,5 59,1
Environmental Protection 4,4 3,9 4,0 4,3 57,8 50,7 37,2 54,2
Electric Energy 4,3 3,5 3,9 4,2 75,0 60,9 28,9 67,0
Primary Schooling 3,2 4,7 4,5 3,5 0,0 2,6 0,3 0,2
Social Assistance 3,4 2,1 4,2 3,5 63,3 31,4 18,7 52,9
Culture 1,8 0,9 2,9 1,9 60,8 26,7 44,9 56,0
Highway Transportation 1,4 0,6 1,3 1,4 33,6 47,0 18,6 31,2
Public Security 1,4 0,5 0,4 1,2 83,2 79,5 78,3 82,9
Tourism 1,0 0,3 1,0 1,0 61,4 18,0 56,4 59,9
Higher Education 0,6 0,4 2,1 0,9 69,8 93,2 29,6 53,0
Secondary Schooling 0,8 0,4 1,0 0,8 15,2 34,3 10,6 14,6
Others 5,5 6,2 9,7 6,3 58,0 25,3 30,6 49,3
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 64,4 55,2 37,0 59,2
Source: Budget and Financial Overseeing Consultancy from the House of Representatives (Câmara dos Deputados) and 
Legislative Database, Cebrap. 
* The execution rate is the total amount of executed amendments (in Reais) upon the total amount of approved amendments in the 
budget appropriation bill; it includes all individual amendments to the investment area of the budget that was presented and 
executed. 
 
It may be true that parliamentary support to the Executive is crucial to the execution of 
amendments but not as the result of a political exchange for every single bill being voted on. 
The prospects for representatives getting their amendments executed depend on the political 
party they belong to. The same is true for voting behavior: party membership is a better 
predictor of the individual support to the Executive. In sum, individual bargaining does not 




Individual amendments are not the priority of the Legislature. Internal resolutions of Congress 
guarantee that the vast majority of resources are channeled to collective and institutional 
amendments. Individual amendments represent a small portion of legislative intervention in the 
final allocation of resources (slightly above 15% of total amendments). And this happens 
without any intervention from the Executive. That is to say, as this is an internal decision of 
Congress, one has to be skeptical of the fact that the budget process is oriented simply to 
respond to local or particularistic interests of representatives’ clienteles. 
 
Despite all this, given the central role normally attributed to the authorization of spending in the 
explanation of Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil, we examined in detail the hypothesis 
that execution of individual amendments are a ‘political currency’ used by the Executive to 
obtain votes on the floor. We concluded that is impossible to confirm the claimed causal 
relation. The authorization to execute individual amendments cannot explain the behavior of 
legislators in roll-call votes. Regression analyses show that party membership is a better 
predictor of voting than execution amendment rates. Careful observation of the data show a 
great number of members of the opposition that get their amendments executed without the 
expected retribution on the floor. On the other hand, there are members of the government 
coalition parties who behave “adequately” on the floor and do not see their amendments 
executed.  
 
A more straightforward way to test the existence of a trade-off between the execution of 
resources and parliamentary support could be done by considering together both turnover rates 
in Congress and the budgetary cycles. Amendments approved at year t may or may not be 
executed only in year t+1. Hence, there are Congress members who are present at time t but are 
not in time t+1. If amendments were “a political currency” used to get support spending on 
pork, these amendments should not have been executed. We have shown that this is not the 
case. The amendments execution rates of members who were not present at time t+1, even 
considering members of the opposition, are not zero. There are also cases of representatives who 
swore in at time t+1 and did not present any amendments at time t. Hence, the Executive would 
not be able to buy the support of these “new” members as a “political currency”. The Executive 
would simply not have a “political exchange tool” at its disposal in order to persuade these 
legislators to vote in support to the government agenda. As we show, these “new members” 
behave like the sophomores: they vote according to party lines.  
 
The fundamental flaw of the “political currency” theses is due to its assumption, namely, that 
representatives have a common interest in promoting distributive policies that could grant (or 
would have the same positive effect to) their chances of reelection. By extension, the interests of 
representatives are seen as in frontal antagonism with the interests of the Executive as if there 
were two independent agendas. As regard to the policies they prefer, the two branches are 
supposed to be playing a zero-sum game. Therefore, when the Executive authorizes the 
execution of resources allocated by individual amendments, the President would do it at the 
expense of his own priorities.  
 
These arguments miss a basic point: the structure of the conflict in the Brazilian political system 
is not between the two branches of government but rather is based on political party cleavages. 
Representatives are divided in two major groups: the ones supporting the Executive and the 
opposition. This distinction implies that the majority supporting the government approves the 
centralization of the budget process in Congress. There is a delegation of power from 
representatives to the general budget rapporteur and his direct collaborators. This delegation 
explains the reduced role individual amendments play in the budgetary process and the 
importance of macroeconomic variables for the rapporteurs’ decisions. Above all, the budget 
aims to guarantee the success of governmental policies, especially the economic ones.  
 
Regarding the priorities of both branches, captured by the allocation of budgetary resources, the 
differences are quite small. There are no conflictive agendas. More specifically, when the 
Executive authorizes the execution of resources allocated by legislators, it is not giving in to 
demands that harm the execution of its agenda. The allocation of resources made by 
representatives is complementary, not contrary to the Executive’s. The latter is able to channel 
the demands of legislators and to accommodate them within the programs that represent the 
government priorities. When the Executive authorizes the execution of amendments proposed 
by members of the opposition and/or the government coalition members who have not voted 
with the government on the floor, it is simply because the Executive is executing its own 
agenda. The control of the budget process by the Executive is so extensive that not even 
opposition representatives have the ability to propose amendments that could form an 
alternative agenda to the one presented by the government.  
 
The right to present individual amendments to the budget bill is an opportunity for 
representatives to express their priorities in terms of public policies. Although they can count on 
a guaranteed fixed amount of appropriations to allocate, representatives cannot, however, 
express their priorities without restrictions. What is given to them, basically, is the opportunity 






1. These visions of the Brazilian system can be found, in different versions, in Ames (1995a; 
1995b; 2001); Bezerra (1999); Pereira (2000a; 2000b); Pereira e Rennó (2001); Pereira e 
Mueller (2003). The consequences of this type of connection to the economy are discussed by 
Franco (1995) and Serra (1994). 
 
2. The database used here covers the period after the reformulation of the budgetary process by 
the approval of Congress Resolution number 2/1995, a direct result of the installation of an 
Investigation Committee formed as a response to a corruption scheme that became public in 
1992, involving members of the Budget Committee, which ended up with many representatives 
losing their election mandates.  In reality, the participation of Congress in the 1994 and 1995 
budgets was quite limited. There is data available for the years before the hyper-inflation-
control Real Plan (1994) but it is virtually impossible to estimate rates of execution as it would 
be necessary to correct the data according to inflation based on the exact month of execution. 
The 2002 data were not available at the time this article was being written. Therefore, the period 
covered here correspond to the availability of data in order to test the hypothesis presented in 
the article. Information on the organization of the database and the construction of variables is 
presented at the Appendix.  
 
3. The official title of this Committee is “Comissão Mista de Planos, Orçamento e Fiscalização 
– CMPOF” or Two-Houses Committee of Planning, Budgeting and Overseeing. However, 
normally an abbreviated form of this title is used  “Comissão Mista de Orçamento – CMO” or 
Joint Budget Committee. We adopt this last abbreviation – CMO – throughout this article.  
 
4. The values used in this article were all corrected by inflation to values of 2001. Thus, the 
ceiling changed every year. It is important to notice that the consistency tests that we developed 
to control the data made some of the amendments that were registered as being approved to be 
excluded from our analysis. For this reason, some legislators appear in our database with 
amounts of values below the ceiling. Note also that some legislators did not exert the right of 
presenting individual amendments. An additional source of differences in the distribution of 
resources to each legislator is due to the decision of organizing data only for appropriations 
allocated to the investment area. Please, refer to the Appendix for detailed information about the 
adopted procedures.  
 
5. It is important to say that for all analyzed years, the number of legislators that had their 
amendments approved was smaller than the total of members (513). Besides legislators that did 
not present amendments, there are cases which all members of a specific State preferred to 
transfer their individual resources to State caucuses amendments. Maybe it is not too much to 
say that these two types of behavior should not be observed if all legislators behaved in an 
individualistic and distributive manner as normally attributed to them. 
 
6. It is important not to exaggerate this point of reasoning. The Executive’s freedom is not 
complete. The decrees of impoundment define cuts on budget units according to the variations 
of revenues.  
 
7. See Figueiredo e Limongi (2002; 2003). 
 
8. It is worth mentioning that small right-wing parties do not appear to receive different 
treatment in comparison to larger ones that are members of the coalition supporting the 
government.  
 
9. Unanimous roll-calls were excluded. Unanimous are all roll-calls that did not present conflict 
among party leaders announced positions and which the minority had less than 10% of total 
votes. 
 
10. These findings differ from previous analysis (for example, Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000) 
as the criteria to consider a roll-call differ in two respects: analyses are restricted to 
constitutional amendments and the absenteeism is classified as indiscipline.  
 
11. The same tests can be done to sub-samples based on different criteria – for example, the 
degree of voting conflict – without changing the results. In all models tested, the rate of 
execution of amendments does not improve the model based solely on party affiliation. Better 
results are obtained if absentees are not treated as non disciplined and excluded from the 
analysis as we usually do. The results of all models are far from being adequate. This problem is 
related to the structure of the data. The independent variables attach to each legislator do not 
vary throughout a specific year. Therefore, as the majority of members of the government 
coalition did vote with the government in the vast majority of the cases, the model predicts that 
every member of the coalition will vote with the government all time.  
 
12. Following the same line of reasoning, 1995 should also have been an extremely difficult 
year for the Executive. 
 
13. The criteria to include these legislators in the analysis are the same ones adopted in the 
previous analysis.  
 
14. Although the rates of reelection cannot be inferred from these figures, since they are also 
affected by leaves of absence and retirement, it is worth noting that these numbers should not be 
observed if rates of reelection were higher. And low reelection rates should not occur were the 
electoral strategies of legislators successful. The adaptation of the North-American model to the 
Brazilian reality misses this basic point. The classical books of Mayhew (1974) and Fiorina 
(1989) are all based on the observation that the reelection rates in the post-war United States are 
very high. 
 
15. Individual amendments are also funded using the resources originally allocated to cover 
extraordinary outlays (Reserva de Contigência) and by reestimating revenues.  
 
  
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Codevasf – Companhia de Desenvolvimento dos Vales do São Francisco e do Parnaíba 
(Company for the Development of the São Francisco and Parnaíba Valleys) 
 
DNER – Departamento Nacional de Estradas de Rodagem (National Department of Highways) 
 
DNOCS – Departamento Nacional de Obras contra as Secas (National Department for Public 
Works against Drought) 
 
Embratur – Instituto Brasileiro de Turismo (Brazilian Institute of Tourism) 
 
GOV – Members of the government coalition parties 
 
Ibama – Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis (Brazilian 
Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources) 
 
Indesp – Instituto Nacional do Desenvolvimento do Desporto (National Institute for the 
Development of Sports) 
 
LWP – Left-wing parties 
 
PC do B – Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil) 
 
PDT – Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Labor Democratic Party) 
 
PFL –Partido da Frente Liberal (Liberal Front Party) 
 
PHS – Partido Humanista da Solidariedade (Humanist Solidarity Party) 
 
PL – Partido Liberal (Liberal Party) 
 
PMDB – Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Party of the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement) 
 
PMN – Partido da Mobilização Nacional (National Mobilization Party) 
 
PPB – Partido Progressista Brasileiro (Brazilian Progressive Party) 
 
PPS – Partido Popular Socialista (Popular Socialist Party) 
 
Prona – Partido da Reedificação da Ordem Nacional (National Order Reconstruction Party) 
 
PSB – Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party) 
 
PSC – Partido Social Cristão (Christian Social Party) 
 
PSD – Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party) 
 
PSDB – Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democratic Party) 
 
PSL – Partido Social Liberal (Social Liberal Party) 
 
PST – Partido Social Trabalhista (Social Laborist Party) 
 
PSTU – Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado (Unified Workers Socialist Party) 
 
PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party) 
 
PTB – Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Laborist Party) 
 
PTN – Partido Trabalhista Nacional (National Laborist Party) 
 
PV – Partido Verde (Green Party) 
 
RWP – Right-wing parties 
 
Sudene – Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (Office for the Superintendency of 
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Notes on the Organization of the Federal Budget Database, Cebrap 
 
The source of information of the data organized here is the database called “Execução 
Orçamentária da União” available on the Internet at the Comissão Mista de Orçamento e 
Fiscalização (Budget Committee) web site, organized by the Budget and Financial Overseeing 
Consultancy from the House of Representatives (Câmara dos Deputados) together with the 
Center of Informatics and Data Processing from the Federal Senate (Senado Federal) – 
Prodasen. This database was reorganized specifically for this research distinguishing the 
allocations in the smallest budget unit (called Rubrica) for the Executive and the Legislature, 
both for the Budget/appropriation bill and the execution of the Annual Budget Law [Budget 
databases]. 
 
The original databases give detailed information on each stage of the budgetary process: the 
project sent by the Executive, the amendments approved in Congress, the final appropriation 
bill, the presidential vetoes, the bill sanctioned by the President and, finally, the amounts 
executed, which, besides the figures allocated in the law, includes extra supplementary credits 
or cancellations that may change budget units originally set in the appropriation bill. 
 
The first treatment of the original data aimed to give internal consistency between the database 
containing the parliamentary amendments and the database on the resources actually spent. For 
example, when in the database of parliamentary amendments the amount approved was higher 
than the same record in the appropriation bill database, corrections were done. Therefore, the 
original amount of resources (in Reais) recorded at the amendments database was reviewed 
based on the amount approved in the appropriation bill. It is very likely that these reviewed 
records are, in fact, errors as they could not have been executed if they were not recorded in the 
appropriation bill.  
 
Additionally, it was necessary to identify the amendments made to the Investment area, which 
meant to identify the ‘group/item of spending’ (called GND, in Portuguese) of each amendment 
as this information was not readily available. A set of computer routines made the association 
between amendments and GND and only small corrections, for internal consistency, had to be 
done when computer routines was not enough to correct them. We built, therefore, parallel and 
integrated databases of all approved amendments for each year. The number of amendments 
varies each year from 5.000 to 10.000.  
 
In order to define the Executive part of the approved budget we simply subtracted the amount in 
the budget/appropriation bill approved by Congress and sanctioned by the Executive from the 
corrected amendments database, guaranteeing, once again, internal consistency of all databases.  
 
Another procedure adopted was to sum all sorts of possible cuts, reallocations and 
supplementary credits that take place into one single variable that we called ‘supplements’. 
Then, we calculated the ‘authorized’ amount of Reais for every single amendment/GND (or the 
real amount authorized for execution), which was the difference between the appropriation bill 
and the ‘supplements’. It is worth noting that a ‘supplement’ that cuts money from an approved 
amendment has a negative value.  
 
Therefore, we could follow the execution of every amendment by different GNDs. Other 
corrections were done at this stage, to guarantee internal consistency among the databases, 
basically making sure that the executed amount would not be higher that the ‘authorized’ 
amount calculated previously and that there were no repetitions of cases.  
 
Once the amount authorized for execution was ready, we could link this information to the 
approved amendments database and calculate the rate of execution for every single amendment.  
At this stage, there were cases we needed to infer the rate of execution because a budget item 
can received more than one amendment (to the same item). We chose, in these cases, to 
calculate the proportional contribution of each amendment to the total amount approved in an 
item and adopted the same (proportional) rule to estimate the amounts authorized for each 
amendment. So, for example, if a specific amendment contributed to 50% of the approved 
budget item, we inferred that 50% of the execution (of this same item) was from that specific 
amendment. Therefore, we could guarantee no double-counting records and maintained internal 
consistency of the databases.  
 
Finally, we would like to note that the data organized in this way – in order to be able to have 
information disaggregated to the smallest budget unit possible and maintain consistency – 
present marginal differences when we compare the amounts sum up by ministries, agencies, 
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